In the strictest definition of materialism which is defined as the belief that only matter and its physical properties are real and that mind, thoughts and the like are simply manifestations of matter then not only is materialism atheistic at face value, but it is also a rejection of the idea of self and freewill which makes materialism altogether deterministic. If this were the pessimistic reality, there would be little reason to contemplate philosophy in the first place. We could all go on our merry way with little concern for what we do or think for it is all a matter of clockwork anyway.
However, I personally reject the notion that materialism – when defined more liberally as the belief in a material reality – ultimately leads to atheism. In fact I think that idea to be down right absurd. Furthermore, to refute materialism by a strict adherence to idealism, as Berkeley did, to be a miserably flawed notion and at best pathetically kneejerk. In the first chapter of the Bible in the book of Genesis (a book Berkeley surely must have read) it says that the first thing God made were the heavens and the earth, very physical realms indeed. This was well before God created mankind; thus materials are very real and important to the Creator himself, not just humanity. Thus, in the strict Judeo Christian sense which Berkley adhered, the idealist conviction that matter is a by-product of the mind is Biblically unfounded and perhaps even heretical. In fact, when we apply the same reasoning that tells us materialism leads to atheism we find that idealism (when adhered to in the strictest sense) leads to atheism as well. We come to this conclusion because if all things are a “by-product” of the mind then God too is merely a by-product of our mind. This makes God a thing to be easily dismissed as mere figment of imagination as is everything other idea. Again, I am arguing along more religious lines here to illustrate that neither materialism or idealism is in and of itself the more "holy" philosophical principle.
Thankfully, with new understanding in the world of natural science, we grasp that where the material world stops and the ideal world begins is a far more blurry line than previously surmised. Knowledge we now have from quantum physics and relativity point to the fact that matter is far more unpredictable than we once thought and that matter itself is nothing more than energy itself. If these near incomprehensible ideas hold true, the metaphysical world and the physical world are now blended in a way that must be dreadfully disconcerting to both the staunch materialist and idealist alike.
The underlying flaw with idealism is this: Idealists claim that reality is ultimately nothing more than a dream state of mind, yet they will argue that their conviction has meaning.
If a person were to believe idealism, he or she must then ask where "ideas" come from. Using dialectic reasoning we shall follow this trail. If we ask where ideas come from in the first place, Berkeley would argue that they come from perceptions. That’s not enough, so we must then ask where perceptions originate and to that question we must answer sensations. At this point I believe idealism meets its first dilemma. The first horn of this dilemma is to believe that sensations are real expressions of the mind to stimuli from the physical world – to believe this, idealism succumbs to materialism. The second horn is to believe that sensations are simply a construct of the mind itself, but even in this case idealism succumbs to materialism by admitting there is a material – the mind itself (whether or not the mind is “physical” is insignificant in this argument for the idealist argues that there is no real “substance” of any kind). In the end, for the idealist to argue that their arguments have meaning is outrageously bizarre because their arguments are literally refuting themselves the instant their words leave their lips into the physical world which they argue does not exist.
Is it possible for a thing to be and not-be at the same time and in the same way?
This is an interesting question that has had me stymied for well over an hour. So, I had to do more research into the matter to obtain a deeper understanding of what the question entailed. To this point I am still unsure of how deep the meaning of the question goes, but I will do my best to unravel its mystery. If we are to believe as Aristotle did, then thinking this way is impossible according to his Metaphysics Book 11 part 5. Here Aristotle says, “…that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, or admit any other similar pair of opposites.” He goes on to say, “He, then, who says 'this is and is not' denies what he affirms, so that what the word signifies, he says it does not signify; and this is impossible.” So, if we were to accept the premise that a thing or word can only be defined in one way and one way only, this would be correct when applied in the strictest sense and rightfully so. However, I believe there are many things and words and persons that have a dual or even multiple nature and thus can be and not be simultaneously in a more loose sense. Also Aristotle’s view can be refuted if you include the possibility of different perceptions from different vantage points or points of view. This more flexible idea allows for paradoxes which are not necessarily contradictions. For a simple example, it is correct to say that dry ice will burn you. This is not a contradiction, but a paradox, in that, dry ice is so cold that it has the same properties as something that is hot. Thus, a thing can be (cold) and not be (hot) in a singular action based on perceived definition of what is and is not.
Are Berkeley’s idealistic metaphysics supported or threatened by contemporary findings in natural science?
Overall I believe Berkeley’s idealistic metaphysical beliefs are, at face value anyway, threatened by contemporary findings in natural science. Berkeley’s foundational principle is that: “The objects of human knowledge…are…ideas.”
Natural science has had much to say about the brain in the recent past. What it has to show us is that mental perception is a very real and integral part of each individual’s reality. What one person perceives may not be the same as what another perceives, thus their ideas may be entirely different based on the same empirical stimuli. This is in keeping with the idealist opinion that ideas are reality in and of themselves. To that extent, natural science lends idealism credence. In the same breath, however, these very findings undermine the basic idealist tenet that matter is a by-product of the mind. To the contrary, natural science points to the fact that our thoughts can at least be seen and charted in the physical world (via EKG, etc.) and at most that our thoughts and ideas stem from physical causality.
Are materialistic metaphysics supported or threatened by contemporary views of natural science?
I think that materialistic metaphysics is in large part supported by contemporary views of natural science. This is due to the fact that natural science concentrates its attention on physical observation and measurement. With every correct prediction natural science makes concerning the physical world it bolsters the plausibility of materialistic metaphysics. On the other hand, natural science may raise as many questions for materialistic metaphysics as it has answers. This stems from the physical scientific study of the mind in natural science. Such studies, when viewed through the prism of materialistic metaphysics, render the thoughts and emotions of the brain to be no more than electrochemical impulses. If this is the case, materialistic metaphysics takes us to a realm where our thoughts, emotions, and our very metaphysical ideas themselves are no more than empty illusions.
